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BALZACIAN LEGALITY: A PROPOSAL FOR NATURAL
LAW JURIDICAL STANDARDS OF LEGITIMACY*
Thomas E. Carbonneaut
BALZACIAN LEGAL STUDIES
There's no better way of exercising
the imagination than the study of
law. No poet ever interpreted nature as freely as a lawyer interprets
truth.
J. Giraudoux, Tiger at the Gates
Since its publication in the nineteenth century, Honor6 de
* An earlier and substantially shorter version of this article appeared in 32 RuroGms L.
Rev. 719 (1979). The present article is an updated and slightly revised version of a
manuscript which was accepted as a thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
degree of Master of Arts in the Department of French Literature and General Linguistics at
the University of Virginia. The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor
Robert Denomm6 for his encouragement and guidance in the pursuit of this project. This
study is dedicated to the author's parent's, Adrien and Lucille Carbonneau.
t An Assistant Professor of Law at Tulane University School of Law, the author holds
the Dipl6me Sup6rieur d'Etudes Francaises from the Universit6 de Poitiers (1971), the A.B.
from Bowdoin College (1972), the B.A. from St. John's College of Oxford University, where
he was a Rhodes Scholar (1975); the J.D. from the University of Virginia (1978); M.A. degrees from Oxford University (1979) and the University of Virginia (1979); and the LL.M.
from Columbia University (1979). Professor Carbonneau is presently a candidate for the
J.S.D. from Columbia University School of Law, where he was a Jervey Fellow.
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Balzac's' monumental literary work, entitled The Human Corn1. The work of the French novelist Honor6 de Balzac (1799-1850) in many respects
parallels that of Charles Dickens. As an adolescent, Balzac was fascinated with philosophy-attracted principally by its systemic approach to reality and its conceptualization of
human activities. Balzac's early novels attest explicitly to his need to conceptualize life and
to embellish it with a hidden intellectual substratum. Although the later novels are less
marked by this tendency, they nonetheless reveal Balzac's ambition to integrate the daily
reality he observed into a systemic intellectual structure.
Despite his early penchant for abstract thought, Balzac never became a pure aesthete;
unlike some of his contemporaries and later nineteenth-century writers, he did not write
exclusively for writing's sake; he refused to establish an uncompromising distance between
his artistic creations and the external reality to which they referred. A reading of his novels
demonstrates that their author, despite his acerbic remarks upon and satirical portraits of
social existence, had an immense and profound love of life'and man. His lengthy descriptions of characters and places are suggestive of a "materialistic" poetic bond tying the author and his writing to the society that was the source of his inspiration. The timeless quality of Balzac's literary creation resides perhaps in that single feature of his writings.
Like many novelists, Balzac was influenced by the intellectual currents and schools of
thought of his day. He became interested in quasi-scientific and parapsychological speculation-an interest which furnished his work with a mystic and visionary quality. Balzac was
forever grasping for the absolute-forever searching for an answer to the hidden mysteries
of life, thought and the universe. His scientific readings lent a certain taxonomic quality to
his character portrayals and his perspective on society. Moreover, the intrigues in his novels
are propelled by invisible forces and laws-much like the immutable laws which govern
natural phenomena. There is ever-present in the Balzacian text a form of scientific determinism-a view that man and his community are guided by and unable to transcend the
baser instincts. This determinism, however, is always counterbalanced by a vision of man's
moral worth-a subjective, admittedly less plausible, and less rigorously defined conception
of social reality which the philosopher-turned-writer refuses to abandon.
Money and greed, sex and prostitution are staples in the Balzacian novel; the philosophic inquiry stands side-by-side with an awareness of the base materialism of life. The
law-as a technical instrument of regulation-serves as the linch pin of intrigues to acquire
wealth and social prestige quickly and dishonestly, usually at the expense of a morally
wholesome character. The twin tendencies of Balzac's personality and his preoccupations
eventually merged into one overriding concern and goal.
The Human Comedy, the title which Balzac gave to his literary production, consists of
some twenty volumes-novels which he wrote essentially during the last twenty years of his
life. In a preface to this work, Balzac declares that his ambition is to act as the "secretary"
of the sociological and historical reality represented by French society in the ninteenth century. An initial reading of The Human Comedy confirms the view that Balzac achieved this
design. In his novels he catalogues character types, social categories and milieux-all of
which are dominated by certain immutable (would-be) scientific rules of social conduct.
Characters, like le p~re Goriot, are dominated, if not obsessed, by a particular passion leading ultimately to their demise; prostitutes, in some of his novels the focus of plots and intrigues masterminded by lucid evil characters, have the misfortune of falling in love and are
doomed to a tragic end. In the almost zoological cosmology, different human and social
types emerge from Paris, la province, and la campagne. They have different occupations
and different degrees of intelligence, and are destined either to social success or ruin. C~sar
Birotteau is -an excellent example of what befalls a character who changes social milieux
without the proper insight and preparation. Throughout these novels, Balzac documents the
impact of history and its transformations upon the mores of society; the emergence of journalism, for example, is testimony to the changing fabric of society and its hastening demise
as a moral entity. Balzac, like Rousseau (although their work is of a very different tone and
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edy, has captured the imagination and gained the admiration of
countless literary scholars and lay enthusiasts the world over.
Rightly or wrongly from a critical perspective, the Balzacian novel
has had special appeal to a readership with a penchant for 'documentary' fiction, i.e., to those readers who assess the worth of a

novel by its affinity to an existing external reality. Although the
view of Balzac as a writer of sociological and historical fiction is by
no means the undisputed final statement of his literary work,' Balzac himself lent support to that view when, in the preface to the
1842 edition of The Human Comedy, he described his literary task
as one of objective and passive observation: "French society was to
be the historian, I was to be but the secretary." 5 However one resolves the apparent conflict between Balzac's realism and the
equally evident moral content of his novels, it is undeniable that
he incorporated large segments of the social reality of nineteenthcentury France-undisturbed-into The Human Comedy. The
fidelity of Balzac's plots and characters to their external models
has been well-documented in a number of areas, including sociolquality), extols a bygone age in which social existence was more in harmony with man's
fundamental nature. This longing for past happiness explains the conservative quality of
Balzac's political views, and his conviction that a form of recognized political authority-such as a revered royalty-was necessary in society and that social distinctions and
classes should be maintained and stabilized.
Balzac's self-proclaimed vocation as sociologist and historian of sorts may explain the
texture of his work, but fails to account for the real thrust, the basic raison d'Otre, of his
literary vocation. Why are Balzacian novels still read today with such enthusiasm? Why
does Balzac's work inspire some to engage in artistic pursuits and still others to enjoy his
writings as timeless literary creations? The same question can be asked of Shakespeare,
Flaubert, Tolstoy and Dickens; as for Balzac, the question deserves a more specific answer.
Balzac's genius consists in his attempt to formulate a literary answer to eternal questions
about man, his essential nature, and the community in which he lives. His relish for life is
combined with a realistic yet positive humanism. Balzac's 'quasi-scientific categories and
speculations have little meaning in the late twentieth century; his vision that man can redeem himself and construct a society befitting the highest potential of his nature is still
relevant, and its relevance will continue. Bazac's work should be read as the speculation of
a natural law philosopher with unusual and pleasant writing abilities; for Balzac, the essential compromise between the individual's needs and desires, and those of the community in
which he lives, can be achieved only through moral reinforcement of man's intellectual gift.
In a word, the Balzacian novel reflects Balzac's deeply felt struggle with materiality and
abstraction-his quest for the absolute and his awareness that man's transcendence of matter can only be finite.
2. H. DR BAzAc, LA CoMutm HUMAINP (P.-G. Castex ed. 1977).
3. For an appraisal of Balzac's realism, see, e.g., M. BARDFCHE, BALZAC ROMANCIER 91
(1945). See generally 1 & 2 R. Guis, BALZAc (1973).
4. See, e.g., Carbonneau, Balzacian Physics and Metaphysics, 20 RomAcE NOTES
(1980).
5. H. D BALzAc, LA COMAVm HUMAIN 7 (1951).
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ogy, commerce and finance.0 The accuracy of Balzac's social observations, however, also extends to his treatment of the law.
Balzac's personal experience in and intimate acquaintance
with the law is somewhat unique-at least in the annals of French
literary history. He was one of the few French writers to hold a law
degree and to have clerked in a lpw office. Even when Balzac's
reputation as a literary figure was still in its formative stages, his
contemporaries already were noticing the imprint that Balzac's legal studies and training had left upon his imagination and his literary vision. Some years later, Th6ophile Gautier, a noted French
poet of the nineteenth century, remarked that Balzac's association
with the law had enabled him "to know the members of the legal
community and enabled him to write later on, in a way that astonished the people of the profession, what we could call the litigation
[content] of The Human Comedy. O
The substance of many Balzacian novels corroborates this assertion. The relatively little-known but significant novel entitled
C~sar Birotteau,e published in 1837, is a good case in point, illustrating not only Balzac's knowledge of technical legal issues, but
also his ability to deploy them effectively in a literary context. The
novel is the story of the commercial success and financial undoing
of a small Paris merchant who comes to the French capital from an
isolated region of France in the hope of making his fortune. Although the merchant, the principal protagonist of the story and
whose name the novel bears as its title, has little in the way of
intellectual aptitude, he personifies an ethic of honesty-his success is due in part to chance, but is built principally upon hard
work and a devotion to an honest way of life. His financial down6. There are three classical studies in this area. See R. BouvIER, BALZAc HOMmE
D'AFFAIRES (1930); J.-H. DONNARD, BALZAC LES R&Lrrt 1CONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DANS LA
COMIDIn HUMAINE (1961); E. FALBTAz, BALzAc Br LB MONDE DES AFFAIRES (1932).

7. Balzac first registered in the Faculty of Law in Paris on November 4, 1816, and
received his degree, bachelier en droit, on January 10, 1819. Thereafter, he worked for Maitre Guyonnet de Merville and Maitre Passez. See A. PEYTEL, BALZAC JURISTE ROMANTIQUE 710 (1950).
8. T. GAUTIR, SOUVENIRS ROMANTIQUES 105 (1929). Later on in the same work, Gautier
compares Bazac's attitude towards the law to that of Stendhal, another prominent nineteenth-century French writer, and states that "Balzac, who had understood money so well,
also discovered poems and dramas in the Code. . . ." Id. at 133. For a more detailed com-

parison between the legal ideas of Balzac and Stendhal, see Jansse, La conception gknkrale
du droit chez Stendhal et chez Balzac, in STENDHAL AND BALZAc 42 (V. del Litto ed. 1972).
9. 6 H. DR BALZAc, LA Counm HuSmwn--CsAR BmormAu 39 (P.-G. Castex and R.
Guise eds. 1977).
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fall is the work of du Tillet, a former employee, who mounts an
intrigue and subtly manipulates the technicalities of the law to
provoke C6sar Birotteau's bankruptcy. C6sar finally rehabilitates
himself, but expends so much of his physical energy in doing so
that it costs him his life.
In the Balzacian cosmology, the rise and fall of C6sar Birotteau has a multifaceted thematic significance, ranging from an
analysis of the mores of the different social and economic groupings within French society to a study of the tacit and insidious
rules which govern the operation of the business and political
worlds, and ending with an assessment of the implications of the
struggle between good and evil for human existence and society.
C6sar's death symbolizes the crucifixion of goodness at the hands
of evil and leaves the reader with a troubling sense that the sordid
character of society leads it to reserve its benefits for the immoral,
that the traditional moral values are defunct and practiced only by
social outcasts, and that any attempt at moral redemption or spiritual salvation must be achieved outside the social framework.
In elaborating this novel, Balzac, as Gautier pointed out,10
made use of the law in a remarkably precise and exact way. When
one reads the applicable provisions of the French Commercial
Code and the legislative history of the enabling statute-the Law
of September 22, 1807-there can be no doubt that Balzac knew of
and relied heavily upon the substance of these provisions to construct the bankruptcy episode in C~sar Birotteau." Balzac's
description not only contains a thorough assessment of the three
principal phases of the actual procedure, but also shows that the
substance of the technical legal rules is eminently adaptable to du
Tillet's corrupt design. In effect, the novel emerges as an adroit
and perspicacious criticism of the substance of the enabling statute-a law review article in fictional form, as it were, on the inequities of the applicable bankruptcy provisions. For example, it becomes readily apparent from Balzac's comments and narrative
portrayal that the regulatory provisions are totally inoperative in
the reality of society and the judicial process, that the legislators
10. See text at note 8 supra.
11. See J.G. Lociw, EsPRff DU CODE DR COMMERCE (1911). See also Guyon, Une faillite
au dbut du XIX sikcle selon le roman de Balzac "Chear Birotteau," in ETUDES OFFERTEs A
ALFREn JAuFFPxr 337 (no date). See generally G. BRu .LL4, PPAcIs DE DROrr COMMERCIAL
(1964); S.-D. CASTELLAN, LE JUGE COMMISSAIRE DANS LA VAILLrrE gr LE R*GLEMENT JUDICIAME

7 (1965).
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not only have failed to strike an equitable balance between the respective legal rights of the creditors and debtors, but also have
been unable even to curtail the fraudulent activity of the parties
involved in these proceedings." What perhaps is most interesting
in this story of the interplay between the law and commercial
schemes is the analogy that Balzac draws between the bankruptcy
procedure and the theatre.la
According to Balzac, the legal process is similar to the presentation of a play, offering to the keen observer of social reality a
twofold drama. On the one hand, there is the play as it is seen by
the audience-in a word, the vision of a contrived reality;" on the
other hand, there is the behind-the-scenes action-the reality of
the play in an unmodified, virgin state.15 It is Balzac's purpose in
writing about social phenomena and the law in particular to unmask their official appearance, to show them in their true light. In
describing the contradictions that inhere in and the injustices that
result from the legislative attempt to reform commercial practice,
Balzac attempts not only to point to the inconsistencies of the law,
but also, and more importantly, to provide, in the person of C6sar
Birotteau, an example of conduct that more closely approximates
the ideal of Justice.' 6 Balzac's objective transcends the base purpose of trying to impress his reader with the accuracy and precision of his legal knowledge; rather, he is making a case for the position that laws which do not reflect man's innate capacity for
positive moral conduct are not really laws at all-but only another
set of empty and valueless rules that are to be manipulated in a
game of never-ending connivance and human degradation.
Through C6sar Birotteau's example, Balzac expresses his deeply
felt conviction that the law should not be a source of ridicule, a
target or tool for men of ruse. Rather, the laws and the legal institutions, for the well-being of all and for the happiness of the indi-"
vidual, should be regarded with the same deference and respect
that C6sar Birotteau has shown them: at the expense of his health
and ultimately his life, Birotteau complied with the law to the very
end.
12. See 3 J.G. LocRE, supra note 11, at 1-7, 16-17.
13. See 6 H. Di BALZAC, supra note 9, at 272.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Carbonneau, Quelques considkrations aur le fonctionnement de la dissertation juridique dans "C6sar Birotteau" (unpublished paper).
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In a sense, Th6ophile Gautier's comment 17 about the astonishing quality of Balzac's legal knowledge was prophetic. At the turn
of the century, French attorneys and law professors were writing
about their astonishment at the accuracy of Balzac's legal plots
and characters. What Gautier failed to predict was their displeasure with what Balzac had had to say about the value of law as a
social institution, in the analytical segment of his fictionalized law
review article. Once it became apparent that the would-be passive
observer of social reality would invest Balzac's realistic Romanesque account of the law with a particular moral significance, with
a critical appraisal of its actual operation, the astonishment and
enthusiasm abated and were transformed into an acerbic and defensive vituperation of the novelist's subjectivity, his unwarranted
intrusion upon the privilieged turf of legal reality.
Joseph Blondel,18 in an address before the Court
of Appeals of
Douai in 1887, credited Balzac with a "genuine originality" because of "this profound knowledge of civil law, this incessant intervention of procedure in so great a number of his works."' 0 He,
however, criticized Balzac for his audacity in adding a literary
man's simplistic and unduly negative
commentary to the descrip1
law":'
the
of
role
"exact
tion of the
But sometimes, the novelist goes further [than description]. Not
content with applying the law, he comments upon it, criticizes
it. . . .'2 [H]e accepts the received wisdom, he only refers to the
Civil Code,
he does not believe in the necessity, in the efficacy of...
8
reform.2

On a more theoretical level, other commentators took violent exception with the philosophy of law that emerged from The Human
Comedy. For example, in 1906, Fernand Roux,' in his book on
Balzac, mounted an elaborate attack upon Balzac's critical concep17. See text at note 8 8upra.
18. Blondel, Du droit et de la procedure dans Honor6 de Balzac (audience solennelie
de rentr~e) (Cour d'appel de Douai, Oct. 17, 1887) (1887). See also Boyer, La magistrature
et le monde judiciaire dans la Comkdie humaine de Balzac, (audience solonnelle de rentr~e) (Cour d'appel de Nhnes, Oct. 16, 1894) (1894); Br6al, Le monde judiciairedans Balzac
(discours prononc6 A P'ouverture de la confrence des avocats) (1903).
19. See Blondel, supra note 18, at 9.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 38.
24. F. Roux, BALZAC JURISCONSULTE ET CRIMINALISTE (1906). Mr. Roux's book was reviewed by Lefort in Rv. GAN. DR. 438 (1907).
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tion of the law by attempting to show that the author's literary
and idealistic bent rendered his treatment of the law and legal
ideas devoid of any "rational or philosophic base.2
These early studies, it is opined, reflect a complete misunderstanding of the literary context in which Balzac's commentary
upon the law emerges. By placing Balzac's observations in an unfair negative light, they work a considerable disservice upon the
intellectual value of Balzac's novels for the legal community. To
dismiss a critique of the law and the legal process on the ground
that it emanates from an homme de lettres, who should have confined himself to the mechanical activity of fact-reporting, amounts
to a denial of the value of intellectual analysis, and certainly rubs
against the grain of any modern lawyer's training. It also casts an
unjustifiable doubt upon the possible value of investigating the nature and substance of law through interdisciplinary inquiry. Roux,
for example, asserts that Balzac's thinking about the law is characterized by "doctrines which imply a false vision of the world,"'
and adds that
If evil is a social fact, good is also one on the same ground....
[Tihis truth in part escaped Balzac .

.

. ; [the] virtuous characters

... remain unexplained exceptions within the work, sickly and
sweet flowers, grown amongst hardy and "noxious" plants."
Such remarks suggest a failure to understand in Balzac the dialectic between good and evil, and the role and thematic significance of
the angelic characters. For Balzac, "social order"2 8 was obtained
not "at the price [of an] . . . imperfect justice,"2 ' but rather
through a form of justice which, from a moral and humanistic perspective, was completely inadmissible. Balzac created a Romanesque world in which "men... spend their time twisting the prescriptions of the Codes"80 to emphasize the point that the laws, in
actual practice, are estranged from the most rudimentary principles of Justice, and to provide examples of inspired alternatives to
the reality upon which his imagination worked and which it
transposed.
More contemporary French scholars writing on this subject,
25.
26.
27.
28.

F. Roux, supra note 24, at 53.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 65.

29. Id
30.

Id. at 64.
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among them Professors Madeleine Saint-Germs sl and Adrien
Peytel, 2 have had the merit of analyzing the legal content of The
Human Comedy from a more detached historical and descriptive
perspective. Their work catalogues the presence, and establishes
conclusively the accuracy, precision and verisimilitude of the legal
elements in Balzac's novels. The late Professor Peytel, in his book
on Balzac, is the most authoritative work in this regard. He writes
of Balzac's experience:
[Tihe novelist would later depend constantly upon the jurist; the
latter brought to the former's imagination solid bases [upon which]
to construct the [narrative] intrigues and to allow them to evolve
according to the rules of legality." [W]e would be hard pressed to
deny that Balzac's juridical sense contributed largely to providing
his works with a solid support, since he is legally precise and that
his undeniable competence . . .allowed . . .him to construct the

most complicated intrigues with the capable and supple mastery of
an experienced businessman."4
This scholarship, in effect, constituted the first step towards bridging the gap between, and thus reconciling, the literary and legal
aspects of Balzac's fiction. While documenting Balzac's legal accuracy, for example, Professor Peytel also insisted, albeit with perhaps too much enthusiasm and too little explanation, upon Balzac's literary realism. 5
The modern studies on the subject of Balzac and the Law
have all been the work of students of literature and have focused
upon specific themes of The Human Comedy or of particular
novels. As with the previous efforts, these studies have been published exclusively in French and have been the work of French academics. Much interest has been generated lately in Balzac's attitude to women, as it is manifested in his description of their legal
status. For example, Marie-Henriette Faillie, in attempting to determine whether Balzac was a proponent of feminism, investigated
"the reactions of Balzac's heroines in relation to the Civil Code
and to the state of quasi-incapacity in which they found them31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
BALZAC

M. SAINT-GERMAS, BALZAc CONSID*RW
A. PEYTEL, note 7 supra.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 18.
See Carbonneau, note 16 supra.
M.-H. FAILLIE, LA FEMME ET LE CODE

(1968).

COMME HISTORIEN DU DROIT

(1926).

CIVIL DANS LA COMIkDIE HUMAINE D'HONORk DE
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selves [legally]. ' 8 7 Arlette Michel" also analyzed the theme of women and the law in Balzac, but only in relation to the Physiology
of Marriageand the Scenes of PrivateLife of 1830. Finally, Pierre
Antoine Perrod" studied Balzac's use and interpretation of the
trust and the estate in tail (property attaching to a title and descending with it).
The task of the present article is twofold. First, it represents
an attempt to make an original English language contribution to
the continuing interdisciplinary inquiry, begun in France, into the
presence of law in Balzac's The Human Comedy, by focusing upon
themes and novels that have not been the subject of previous individual study. Second, it seeks to contribute to an area of growing'
interest to legal scholars in the United States 40-the study of law
and literature-by providing an example of the insights one
French novelist with legal training and experience had into questions that forever perplex and challenge the minds of those who
teach and practice law; the relationships among legality, legitimacy, morality and personal and community ethics. The scope of
the inquiry centers principally upon one of Balzac's major novels,
Lost Illusions,4 1 and the thematic structure of its third and final
part. It is the thesis of this study that this novel contains many of
the principal tenets of Balzac's legal thought, and that those facets
of his legal thought are brought out more clearly through an analysis and understanding of the novelist's propensity toward idealism
(as opposed to his historical realism). This idealistic propensity is
to be seen in the personality and status of the angelic characters in
the novel.
THE NOVEL AND ITS INTRIGUE
Lost Illusions, as the title suggests, is a story about the confrontation between the purity of ideals and the corrosive immorality of society, a theme that runs through the fabric of many of
37.
38.
"ScMes
39.

Id. at 11.
Michel, La femme et le Code civil dans la "Physiologie du Mariage" et les
de la Vie Privue" de 1830, in LE R*E ET LE TEXT 135 (1974).
Perrod, Balzac et les "Majorats," [1968] ANN. BALZAC 211 (1968).

40. See Gest, The Law and Lawyers of Honor6 de Balzac, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (1911);
Suretsky, Search for a Theory: An Annotated Bibliography of Writings on the Relation of
Law to Literature and the Humanities, 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 727 (1979); K. KRUTCHMAN,
LEGAL NOVELs: AN ANNOTATED BUILIOAuHY (Tarlton Library Legal Bibliography Series,
No. 13, 1979).
41. 5 H. DE BALZAC, LA COM*DIE HUMAINE-ILLUSIONS PERDUES 123 (P.-G. Castex & R.

Chollet eds. 1977).
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Balzac's novels. Lucien, a young man who aspires to poetic fame
and social notoriety, eventually migrates to Paris after deciding
that the provincial setting proffered by his hometown, Angoulme,
is unable to provide him with an atmosphere to promote these ambitions. Although Lucien is capable of inventing dreams of glory
and wealth, the weakness of his character prevents him from being
able to transpose these fictions into the reality of life. His love affairs and growing indebtedness set the stage for the misfortune
that inevitably befalls Eve and David S6chard, his sister and
brother-in-law, who have remained in Angoul~me to raise their
family and to continue the printing business David bought from
his miserly father. David and Eve are the angelic characters of the
story; despite the obstacles against which they struggle (thanks to
Lucien's irresponsible behavior and the greed of David's father),
they persevere in their quest to build an honest and decent life for
themselves. In fact, David is the true poet-creator of the novel-he
tirelessly pursues his research on an idea that will lessen substantially the cost of manufacturing paper and revolutionize the printing industry. During his stay in Paris, however, Lucien contracts
debts in his brother-in-law's name from an associate of David's local competitors, the Cointet brothers, who not only want to expand
their business to meet the needs of an increasingly industrialized
society, but also see David's forthcoming invention as indispensable to that design. It is at this juncture of the story that the law
comes to play a part in the struggle between good and evil.
In the third part of the novel, Balzac describes David's
financial and legal tribulations, which are the result of Lucien's
financially irresponsible conduct in Paris and of the Cointet's desire to lay their hands upon his ideas and invention. The evolution
of the plot characteristically is set into a deterministic framework,
which the narrator carefully prepares and sets in motion and in
which the social facts are accompanied by moral interpretations. In
the Balzacian universe, the good and virtuous are always at a disadvantage and, in fact, are doomed to defeat-at least in a materialistic sense. David's kindness leads him to accept Lucien's irresponsibility without protest, and his morally wholesome
personality makes him particularly vulnerable to the insidious
strategy that the Cointet brothers are preparing. David's absolute
devotion to his work as an inventor and the rectitude of his character in effect prevent him from even suspecting that the Cointet
brothers are carefully laying a trap for him. Boniface Cointet, a
mastermind of commercial intrigue, however, holds all the aces: his

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 27:1

knowledge of human nature and his ruse allow him to mount a
scheme built upon the loopholes and technicalities of the commercial law. More importantly, his plan includes the cooperation of
Petit-Claud, a local solicitor, whose enormous desire for success is
buttressed by an utter insensitivity to the ethics of his profession.
THE DESCRIPTION OF MAITRE PIERRE PETIT-CLAUD
The law is good, if a man use it
lawfully.
1 TIMOTHY 1:8
The Cointets' Man
In the narration of the first meeting between Boniface Cointet
and Maitre Petit-Claud, Balzac attempts to describe the essential
characteristics of the young lawyer's personality by establishing a
relationship between his social and geographic origins, his person,
and the values that he espouses. The similarity between the roots
and present social station of Petit-Claud and David is not unlike
the parallel Balzac draws between du Tillet and C6sar in the novel
C sar Birotteau.4 s As in that work, the distinction between David
and Petit-Claud emerges only when it becomes clear what type of
moral conduct they choose to pursue as social beings; in a word,
whether they decide, or-more precisely-whether they are cast, to
play the part of social outcasts or successful participants in the
immoral game of society.
Despite his lack of professional experience and modest, practically inexistent, financial resources, Petit-Claud's burning desire to
succeed had pushed this "small town tailor's son' 4 to buy the business of his former employer. He intended to pay the money he
owed by marrying a rich heiress. Petit-Claud's physical appearance
was as attractive as his ignoble vision of marriage: "this small
skinny lawyer . . . marked by small pox . . . [was] balding . . .
[his] forehead and the top of [his] head already were indistinguishable. . . ."" Much like some of Dickens's lawyers, his physiognomy announced an inward personality devoid of any sense of be42. See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
43. 5 H. DE BALZAC, supra note 41, at 586.
44. Id.
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nevolence-a sly man with a clever mind but with a malicious
nature. His thievish "magpie eye,"'45 his inflexible demeanor and

fastidious attitude were the indicia of his bent for dishonesty .and
dissimulation:
Pierre Petit-Claud appeared to have a certain amount of venom
mixed into his blood. His face had one of these colorations of a dirty
and confused tint which is the mark of old illnesses, the nights of
misery, and almost always of bad feelings ....

[O]ne expression can

paint this boy in two words: he was curt and angular. His broken
voice harmonized itself with the bitterness of his face, with his slender air, and with the indecisive color of his magpie eye. 46
Despite these drawbacks, Petit-Claud had complete confidence
in himself and in his abilities-and justifiably so. During his apprenticeship with his predecessor, Maitre Olivet, he had shown an
insatiable appetite and an inexhaustible capacity for work. As he
himself relates to Boniface Cointet, I was "buried in the office or at
court on ordinary workdays; and, on Sundays or holidays, ... [I
worked] . . . to finish . . . my education. . . " His principal

quality, however, was not his industriousness, but rather his irreducible individualism; to arrive at the summit of his profession, he
48
relied only upon himself: "I expected everything from myself.'
Although Balzac does not make Petit-Claud into a ludicrous character, attributing to him, for example, in spite of his provincial origins "a certain superiority, ' ' 49 he deemed, in his capacity as the

moral commentator of the work, that even Petit-Claud's positive
personal qualities were to be feared: "Petit-Claud relied even more
upon himself, since he did not lack a certain superiority, rare in
the provinces, but the principle of which was in his hatred." 60
Petit-Claud's abilities gave him the promise of a prestigious career,
but within the framework of a society the principal forces of which
were rapacity and egotism; his talents would be used against the
interests of humanity, as the exclusive instruments of his "corrosive desire to succeed."51
During this initial meeting, Boniface Cointet had no difficulty
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id.

49. Id. at 586.
50. Id.
51.

Id.
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in perceiving that Petit-Claud was the man for the job, nor did he
have to apply much pressure to convince him to join his ranks. In
order to gauge the young lawyer's moral and ethical sensitivity,
Boniface first asked him to approach David S~chard in a way that
bordered upon a violation of a lawyer's permissible activity in regard to clients and the solicitation of business. Cointet's request
did not provoke any undue protest from Petit-Claud, since it was
technically permissible:
"You can then go announce your nomination [as a solicitor] to
David and offer him your services," said the great Cointet.
"That [simply] is not done," replied the young solicitor.
"There has never been any trial, he has no solicitor, it can be
done," replied Cointet who eyed the young solicitor from head to
foot from the rim of his glasses.52
In exchange for Petit-Claud's complicity, Cointet promised to
arrange for his marriage to Mile Franqoise de La Haye, "the sole
heiress of the Cardanet and the S6nonches"" families-a conjugal
union that would provide Petit-Claud not only with the money to
pay Maitre Olivet, but also with "clients from a large part of the
Angouldme aristocracy . . . [and] . . . a magnificent future.""" A

thirst for success and seduced by its promise, Petit-Claud responded to Cointet's offer unhesitatingly: "What must be done?"'
Boniface indicated that he wanted him to engage in an act of professional misconduct: while assuring David S~chard that he would
represent his interests in the litigation to be initiated against him
by the Cointet brothers and their Paris associate, M6tivier, PetitClaud, would in fact worsen his client's financial position and
strengthen that of his adversaries by increasing defense costs
through the misuse of the technical rules of judicial procedure:
What must be done, my friend? eh! but the [financial] matters of
David Schard. This poor devil has a thousand pieces of gold in
notes to pay us; he will not pay them; you will defend him against
the suits in such a way as to accumulate an enormous amount of
expenses....

Don't worry, go forward, pile up the motions.

Doublon, my process-server, who will be charged to bring an action
against him, under Cachan's direction, will not go at it mort52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

585-86.
588.
588-89.
589.

19811

Balzacian Legality

main ....

To a good listener, a word suffices. Now, young man?

56

Petit-Claud agreed to violate his professional responsibilities
without so much as blinking an eye, without a moment of moral
hesitation. Rather than toy with the ethical implications of his
complicity, he sought to discover the full import of Cointet's plans
and to find any possible flaws in them. Moreover, to dissuade his
'real client' from double-crossing him, Petit-Claud made it clear
that in such an eventuality he would retaliate with the full force of
the law:
"You therefore want to ruin Schard?" Petit-Claud asked.
"Not completely; but he must be kept in jail for a time.
"And for what purpose? . . ."
"Do you think I'm foolish enough to tell you? If you're smart
enough to guess it, have enough intelligence to keep quiet about it."
"[Old] father S6chard is wealthy," said Petit-Claud already starting
to perceive Boniface's [hidden] ideas and seeing a cause of failure.
"As long as the father lives, he will not give his son a half-farthing,
and this former typographer does not yet want to print his death
certificate. .. " D
"Agreed [then]!" said Petit-Claud who decided promptly.
"I don't ask any guarantees from you, I am a lawyer; if I am tricked,
we will settle the score together."
'The rascal will go a long way,' thought Cointet as he bid fare7
well to Petit-Claud.5
According to the narrative of this meeting, it is undeniable
that the conception of the solicitor as an officer of the court, an
agent in the administration of justice, and the unfailing advocate
of the rights and interests of his client is completely inoperative in
the Romanesque reality. This commonplace conception of the so-.
licitor is denied categorically by the characters' dealings and negotiations-its inspirational value negated by the modus vivendi, the
rapacious quest for material wealth and power, of the individualistic society. From the description of his origins and the narrative of
the meeting, it is clear that even the most rudimentary principles
of personal and professional integrity have had absolutely no impact either upon Petit-Claud's choice of a profession or upon the
way he goes about its practice. For him, law was, first and foremost, a means of furthering his own ends: he disregarded even ele56. Id.
57. Id. at 589-90.
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mentary legal norms when the promotion of his self-interest required him to do so. Balzac's description of Petit-Claud's
loathsome sacrifice of his legal vocation and mission to the god of
personal and unscrupulously attained success is, however, but a
preface to his treatment of the law and the lawyer's role in this
Romanesque society demeaned by its covetousness.
The Provincial Solicitor
Everywhere in Balzac's work, the events that occur and the
characters who live in the provinces are of an inferior rank and
importance when they are compared with their Parisian analogues.
According to Balzac, the most interesting narrative of man's quest
for happiness and struggle with misfortune is one based principally
upon observations of the Parisian social reality. In Lost Illusions
Balzac characteristically insists that a Paris solicitor never would
have colluded with Boniface Cointet, implying that Petit-Claud's
complicity is the product not only of his personal origins and ambition, but also of the way in which law was practiced in the
provinces.
In the first place, the Paris solicitor, whom Balzac considers to
have the qualities of a true diplomat, takes matters only of the
highest importance. Moreover, he is compensated with retainers,
the amount of which depends upon the "more or less able handling
of the matter."" Finally, the Paris solicitor is a legal specialist who
takes only cases that challenge his expert procedural knowledge
and training: "the Paris solicitor rarely argues in a court of law.""
On the other hand, his provincial counterpart, far removed from
the center of the great interests of society, attends to lesser legal
problems and needs-to the "bagatelles" 0 of mediocre men. The
cases he handles involve trifling matters the resolution of which are
so commonplace that the provincial solicitor's quality as a profes58. Id. at 587.
59. Id. As will become apparent from the discussion that follows, Balzac's view is
based upon what happened in actual practice. Until very recently, the French legal system,
like the English, was divided into two components: avouk (solicitor) and avocat (barrister).
The French solicitors were concerned exclusively with procedural work (la postulation) and
did not argue in court-that task was reserved to the French equivalent of a barrister. Balzac's discussions imply that this theoretical distinction was not respected in country law
practice but was fairly strictly followed in Paris. Although the basis of Balzac's distinction
may have been grounded in an observation of what actually occurred, it does not accord
with the systemic principles that governed the french legal system at that time.
60. Id.
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sional could not possibly have any bearing upon the outcome of
the case. As a consequence, he is remunerated according to the
number of services which he renders to his client. His professional
activity is much less honorable; instead of acting as a great
stateman, the provincial solicitor performs the ministerial functions of an unimportant civil servant:
In the provinces ... the solicitors cultivate what we call in the Parisian law offices the morass [of legal technicalities], the multiplicity
of small acts which overload the memoranda of costs and use up
stamped paper. These trifles occupy the provincial solicitor, he sees
costs to be made there where the Paris solicitor only concerns himself with retainers. 61
Should the solicitor of the provinces nonetheless preserve a
certain quality of professional distinction despite the lamentable
kind of legal work he is called upon to perform, the necessity of
pleading his own cases before the courts, of acting as a barrister,
would render him a mediocre attorney. Dressing his remark in the
garb of historical authenticity, Balzac declares:
[I]n 1822, in the majority of the departments . . . , the solicitors
were barristers and pleaded their cases themselves. From this
double life, there results twice the tasks that give the solicitor of the
provinces the intellectuai vices of the barrister, without relieving
him of the onerous responsibilities of the solicitor. The solicitor of
the provinces becomes garrulous, and looses this lucidity of judgment, so necessary to the [proper] conduct of the cases. By dividing
himself in two, a superior man often finds two mediocre men within
himself.... By talking so much, a man ends up believing what he
says....62
To these shafts of satire directed at the country solicitors of his
day, Balzac adds a final touch of irony when he summarizes their
unfortunate professional station:
A solicitor of the provinces therefore has many reasons for being a
mediocre man: he allies himself with petty passions, he conducts
small matters, he earns his livelihood by generating costs, he abuses
the Code of Procedure, and he pleads before the courts! In a word,
he has many infirmities. Also, when one meets a remarkable man
among country solicitors, he is really a superior fellow! 8
61. Id.
62. Id. at 587-88.
63. Id. at 588.
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As a solicitor practicing in the provinces, Maitre Pierre PetitClaud shares the professional imperfections and the paltriness that
Balzac imputes to his colleagues. To mount his assault against
David S~chard, Boniface Cointet not only plays upon Petit-Claud's
sense of ambition, but also seeks to take advantage of his provincial aptitude to create unnecessary litigation costs through the
abuse of the law's procedural technicalities. Petit-Claud's collaboration in this sordid affair, then, is the result both of his personality and of his professional predispositions as a country lawyer.
However much he may want to condemn Petit-Claud's willingness
to conspire with Boniface Cointet, the reader, once he considers
the factual determinism that makes up the Romanesque reality, is
unable, in objective terms, to find evidence of a sufficient mens rea
upon which to premise Petit-Claud's culpability. The inevitability
of his personal origins and development appears to leave him without the possibility of choosing his own destiny and, as a consequence, frustrates any attempt to establish a clear line of causality
between his misdeed and his willful intent to engage in wrongdoing. Moreover, the substance of the underhanded intrigue that he
has agreed to advance reflects the tacit laws which govern social
success and which alone appear to be the functional rules of conduct in the Romanesque reality of the text. In effect, by casting all
moral considerations aside, Petit-Claud demonstrates that he has a
superior and lucid insight into the nature of social existence-thereby guaranteeing himself material well-being and a
high social and professional position.
Balzac's literary design, however, seems to transcend this pure
and simple statement of the pervasive hold of evil upon a fictional
world that is supposed to reflect the actual operations of existing
society. To the great relief of the reader who is concerned with the
moral implications of human activity, a code of human ethics and
values accompanies and competes with Balzac's portrait of the corruption of social reality. Despite the ingenuity and perspicacity of
the amoral characters, the narrator tries to defend the position
that human pursuits which no longer refer to a sense of higher
moral principles are devoid of their basic raison d'Stre. Although
Balzac accounts for the degeneration of the society that he portrays in terms of the mutation of historical forces, he criticizes the
use men have made of the social institutions that they have inherited, and lays blame upon them as individuals for having chosen
voluntarily to integrate themselves into a corrupt social structure
from which they could always have asserted their independence.
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Balzac's intention is to aver the possibility of a more humane social existence-not one having the vitality of Paris (for after all
Paris is only the ideal of the narrative taxonomy), but rather a way
of life which approximates the essential values of human dignity,
as personified by the angelic characters who represent the narrator's ideal conception of humanity. By acquiescing to the forces of
historical and social determinism, the individual misuses the freedom he possesses, and becomes responsible for an act of cowardice
that offends his dignity and violates the sacred heritage of
humanity. Instead of submitting to enslavement, he should use his
abilities to mould the inert historical and social forces to have
them reflect the basic and most noble qualities of human nature.
This idealistic vision of humanity, which implicitly underpins
every facet of the text, becomes more apparent when Balzac adumbrates his conception of legality through a description of the technical character of procedural law.
THE LAW AND JUDICIAL COMBAT
Wrong must not win by
technicalities.
Aeschylus, The Eumenides

An Illegitimate Legality
When he begins to describe and analyze the legal action taken
against David S6chard, Balzac attempts to point to the inconsistency between the application of the laws and the statement of
their purpose in theoretical terms. As in C~sar Birotteau, Balzac
seeks to unmask the deceptive appearance of things, to give his
reader a behind-the-scenes perception of the nature of law and the
judicial process." According to Balzac, although law is the social
instrument that governs the daily relationships of men, its rules
and purposes are known only to a small minority of interested
parties:
Of a hundred readers, ninety would be enticed by the following details [of the litigation] as by the most stimulating novelty. Thus the
truth of this axiom once again will be proved:
There is nothing which is less well known than what everyone
64.

See text at notes 13-16 supra.
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*should know, THE LAW!65
This ignorance of the law is not the result of an intrinsic intellectual incapacity on the part of men; rather, it emerges from the entanglement of legislative provisions and from the befuddling complexity of the legal process. Despite the theoretical protections and
safeguards that the technical character of the law may proffer the
individual, its substance can be understood only by those initiated
to its intricacy-by those who promulgate and administer it and by
those whose conduct is the subject of its regulations. It has little
relation to the assumptions men commonly hold about justice.
Thus does the legal system invite its own subversion by an elitist
and stealthy manipulation of technicalities. The laws cease to refer
to a higher standard of what is just and become the tools for the
self-centered aggrandizement of a privileged few.
To support this appraisal of the law, Balzac cites the example
of the banking procedure relating to dishonored returned bills, the
compte de retour,66 which is authorized by law and which allows a
creditor bank to begin collection proceedings against a recalcitrant
debtor. Balzac describes it as "the mechanism of one of the intricate procedures of the Bank, ''67 which consists in a series of "proceedings, [which are] perfectly legal, by which, in ten minutes, the
Bank adds twenty-four francs of interest to the principal [of a
debt] of one thousand francs." 8 In other words, rather than establish and promote legitimate relationships in the world of commerce, the law that regulates the compte de retour proclaims as
legal (that is, in conformity with the established dictates of justice)
dealings that are in fact inequitable, unjust and dishonest. Balzac,
who may have worked on banking matters during his clerkships,"
condemns the advantage that this procedure confers upon the
bank vis-h-vis the debtor, and the opportunity it provides the bank
to enrich itself without providing any real service. The compte de
retour is one of these "ingenious pranks. . . that a certain article
of the Commercial Code authorizes, and the explanation of which
shows . . . how many atrocities are hidden under this terrible
word: legality!"7 0 In contradistinction to the writer of fiction,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

5 H. D. BALZAC, supra note 41, at 591.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593.
See text accompanying note 7 supra.
5 H. DE BALZAC, supra note 41, at 591 (emphasis in the original).
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whose work mirrors a quintessential reality, the lawgiver constructs only "implausible
' 7' 1

. . . tale[s] .

.

. filled with terrible

fictions.
This comparison between the creative work of the literary author and of the legislator sheds new light upon Balzac's conception
of the law and, more indirectly, upon the distance that separates
the values he holds dear from the social scheming that he describes
in his novels. To earn the distinction of being called artistic, the
literary work must contain a truthful insight into human nature
and man's activity as a human being. As he shapes a Romanesque
image of reality-as he imposes his personal interpretation upon
it-the writer must remain faithful to the essential character of the
reality which inspires him but is outside the confines of his work.
The plausible reconstitution of reality, however, is only a preliminary stage in the novelist's work. He must arrive at the elaboration
of a 'super-reality,' more authentic than the original model, which
codifies, as it were, within the framework of a fictional narrative, a
perception of the common, fundamental elements that are intrinsic
to the human experience, despite the disparity and incongruity of
that experience. In other words, the writer starts with unruly concrete data, moulds them into a fictional texture, and, by a sudden
shift of rhetorical and esthetic perceptions, penetrates to the quintessential truth that lay hidden beneath the heterogeneous appearance of reality.
Balzac maintains that the legislator's creative labors, however,
bring about a totally different result. While his imagination works
on the same reality, the legislator envisages it from a sterile perspective, considering only its appearances and interpreting its multifarious characteristics in such a way as to denature rather than
embellish them. His efforts result in the fabrication of an artificial
reality-a real fiction, a pure sham, devoid of any resemblance to a
conception of an ideal Justice. In promulgating statutes, the legislator builds a legal system bereft of any principle of legitimacy,
which becomes a framework for the harboring and fostering of ignominious social intrigues. Since they lack any basis of legitimacy,
the laws destroy their principal, if not their sole, justification; they
exist and operate to maintain and preserve a fundamentally unjust
social order.
Despite his intimate awareness of what he conceives to be the
71.

Id. at 596.
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actual operation of law in society, Balzac's perception of the antinomy between the aims of the literary writer and the designs of the
legislator shows to what extent he disassociates himself from the
social depravity described in his novels. He reveals the abuses sheltered by the turgid prose of statutes only to denounce them more
forcefully by making the case for a better, more acceptable form of
regulation for human conduct. The dichotomy between the theoretical foundations of the law as a social institution and the uses
men make of law is especially evident in his treatment of French
procedural law in the S6chard case.
The Battle
Like all things human, French procedure has [its] vices; nevertheless, as does a double-edged weapon, it serves a defensive purpose as
well as an offensive one. Moreover, it has an agreeable [feature], in
that if two solicitors understand one another .
, a trial then resembles war.. . . Two generals can prolong the war forever by arriv-

ing at nothing decisive and sparing their troops..
Balzac's observation shows that, as a legal institution, French
procedural law has the not inconsiderable merit of being impartial
and objective, provided, of course, that the solicitors involved comply with the theoretical rationale of its prescriptions and have
their clients' best interest in mind: the procedural rules give the
adversaries an equal number of means to defend their respective
positions. Since they direct the "game of judicial artillery, ' "" and
despite their divergent loyalties, the solicitors also are capable of
prolonging the evolution of a case by filing a number of motions
either to spare their clients useless losses or to avoid taking too
hasty an initial position or, in yet other circumstances, to "set [the
client's] matters on fire."' Therefore, the corrupt use of the procedural rules of law does not call into question their theoretical bases, but rather the moral quality and professional conscience of the
practitioners who make use of the legal process. The ethical application of law therefore depends upon the earnestness with which
72. Id. at 608. Balzac's characterization of the French system of litigation as explicity
adversarial does not do justice to the distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial mod-

els of adjudication. The French system, in light of the judge's central role, is clearly in the
latter category. This qualification does not mean that Balzac's description is per force inaccurate, but rather that it tends to underemphasize the traditional distinction. It should be
read with this reservation in mind.
73.
74.

Id. at 612.
Id.
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the solicitors take their responsibility as officers of the court.
According to Boniface Cointet's scheme, Petit-Claud and Maitre Cachan, counsel for the opposing party, were to engage in a
costly fray the purpose of which was to place David S~chard in a
position of being unable "to honor . . . [his outstanding]
obligations:"17
[Of assets belonging to S6chard and amounting to a value of about
four thousand francs, Cachan and Petit-Claud had made it a pretext
for seven thousand francs of [legal] costs and fees without counting
future [expenses] the flower of which promised [to bear] rather nice
fruits ..

.7

From the sole perspective of competency in technical legal artisanship, the motions submitted by Petit-Claud to the courts constituted a remarkable, even admirable, piece of work. As Balzac himself remarks: "Most certainly the practitioners . . . would give
their esteem. . . to Petit-Claud."' 7 7 When, however, this legal work
is assessed in terms of the motivation that underpins it and according to standards espoused by "people with heart,"' 78 it is seen
in its true light as an abuse of legal procedure and of the client's
confidence, which causes Ekve, David's wife, to cry out in despair:
"'My God . . . but isn't the cure worse than the disease?' "7 In
effect, the legal services and remedies that Petit-Claud affords his
client cost David nearly twice as much as the amount of the initial
judgment rendered against him, without freeing him from the obligation of paying the principal amount of his debt. All these motions, counterclaims and appeals are simply a tactic to buy
time-at the client's expense and without his fully informed consent. This preposterous administration of justice arouses the anger
of the narrator, who lets his reader know the full force of his outrage at so patent an injustice, of his disgust that this type of fraud
could be perpetrated in the name of legality:
[I]t is necessary for the legislator, if however the legislator has the
time to read, to know to what point the abuse of procedure can go.
Shouldn't we put a little law together which, in certain cases, would
prohibit the solicitors from exceeding in costs and fees the amount
for which suit is filed? Isn't there something ridiculous in submitting
75.

Id. at 593.

76. Id. at 612.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79.

Id. at 614.
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a [piece of] property of one centiare to the formalities which govern

a piece of land measuring one million! We'll understand, by this account ...

the value of these words: formality, justice, fees .

80

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS: DAVID

AND EVE "RUINED BUT LEFT ALONE"81

If they are just, they are better
than clever.
Sophocles, Philoctetes
Balzac's description of Petit-Claud and exposition on French
procedural law are but the prolegomena necessary to understand
the principal parts of the legal episode of the novel. To finish off
his client, who is facing possible imprisonment for his financial
misfortunes, Petit-Claud sets him at variance with his father,
thereby depriving him of all possible financial support and leaving
him no other course of action than to become a fugitive, a "voluntary prisoner," 8 hunted and, finally, owing to yet another series of
adroit secret maneuvers by his attorney, arrested and incarcerated.
The unrelenting harassment and moral stigma of imprisonment
finally crush David's resistance and produce for his adversaries the
intended and inevitable benefit: his consent to sign a partnership
agreement with the Cointet brothers. The agreement represents
the culmination of the Cointets' avaricious design to lay hold of
David's invention. It also bears witness to the fact that the operation of the laws-those promulgated officially as well as those
which emanate from the operation of society-place social success
within the exclusive province of those men who adopt the Machiavellian attitude that morality is irrelevant to the assessment of
man's conduct in society.
Laws and Mores

In describing the various stages of the scheme mounted
against David S6chard, Balzac takes up a number of ideas already
outlined in C~sarBirotteau,83 most notably the idea that the structure of the legal system and the substance of the laws place a
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 612.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 639.
See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra.
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higher importance upon safeguarding the interests of creditors
rather than protecting the rights of debtors: "The force of the law
. . . definitely belongs to the creditor."" The manipulation of the

legal process by David S6chard's adversaries, however, also occasions a new series of observations upon the legal structure and the
policies that inform it. For example, Petit-Claud warns David of
the imminence of his imprisonment for debt:
Farewell, my dear David, you have been warned, the imprisonment
for debt cannot be stopped by an appeal, it is your creditors' final
resort, [and] they will make use of it. Therefore, flee! . . 85

This physical coercion, to be exercised against the recalcitrant
debtor when all other legal remedies have failed, not only is destined to be ineffectual (its principal justification appears to be .a
retributive rationale since, once deprived of his freedom, the
debtor cannot possibly make amends for his financial irresponsibility), but is also, as Balzac underscores, an extreme and unnecessary measure, violative of a basic sense of humanity. Notwithstanding apparent imprecision and confusion in the details of the
pages describing the arrest of debtors in the provinces," Balzac's
critical evaluation of the theoretical implications of this procedure
upon the operation of the legal system constitutes a sound case for
the need for a reform of the legal policy which it represents. By
granting creditors an unwarranted power in a situation that often
involves bitterness as well as hardship, the law allowing the imprisonment of debtors becomes a tool "of blind passions, or of vengeance. ' ' 87 As such, it threatens to undermine the detachment and
impartiality of the legal system. Because of its "absolutely unnecessary cruelty,"" the provincial mores, the intimate communal
character of the small town, in fact, hamper its effective
application:
In the large cities, there are enough poor wretches, depraved people,

with neither faith nor law, to serve as spies; but in the small cities
everyone knows each other too well to be able to be the hired hand
of a process-server. Whoever, in the lower class, would engage in this
84. 5 H. DE BALZAC, supra note 41, at 620.
85. Id. at 617.
86. As the editor notes, the passage on the arrest of debtors in the provinces "is confused and, it appears, inaccurate." Id. at 1389 (page 621 n.1).
87. Id. at 621.
88. Id.
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form of degradation, would be obliged to leave the city. 9
The interaction that Balzac establishes between the application of the laws and the mores of the community constitutes only
the bare outline of a possible jurisprudential theory. His observations nevertheless appear to modify somewhat the thrust of his
conclusions concerning the nature of promulgated statutes and
their role within the legal system. By asserting that the mores of a
people "often [can] change the laws [even] to the point repealing
them,"90 Balzac unquestionably makes room in his pessimism for
the possibility of eliminating the flaws of unjust or inequitable laws
within the confines of the established legal system. Although this
purification process takes place only after the laws have been enacted and does not officially alter their original illegitimacy, this
statement of the primacy and salutary effect of mores upon the law
reveals that the moral anomalies which seem to permeate
Balzacian society have not completely extinguished a basic sense of
justice within the general population. The practical effect of this
reassertion of justice is to establish a balance between the respective positions of the creditor and debtor:
Thus, the arresting of a debtor not being, as in Paris or in the great
centers of population, the object of the special work of commercial

agents, it becomes an extremely difficult procedural task, a battle of
wits between the debtor and the process-server whose tactics sometimes have become interesting... [newspaper] ...accounts.91
The Prisons
By enticing the unknowing cooperation of Lucien, David's
brother-in-law who has returned from Paris without learning to
curb his irresponsibility, and by using the treacherous services of
C6rizet, one of David's former employees, Petit-Claud manages to
locate David and to have him arrested and imprisoned while continuing to hide from his client the true purpose of his legal representation. To reap the fruits of his unethical conduct, Petit-Claud
now need only persuade David to go into partnership with the
Cointet brothers. According to Balzac, the accomplishment of this
last task is facilitated considerably by the inhuman conditions
prevalent in the prisons of the time.
89. Id. at 621-22.
90. Id. at 621.
91. Id. at 622.

19811

Balzacian Legality

Bazac's description of the interior physical setting of the
prison provides, on its own, ample evidence of the fact that the
local prison to which David was sent after his arrest existed to
punish criminals rather than provide a framework for their rehabilitation. Society certainly was not concerned with the dignity or
human rights of individual prisoners; it already deemed itself generous for providing them with the bare necessities of life. This indifference and scorn were evident especially in the fact that the
Angoulme prison still retained, in the nineteenth century, much
of its medieval structure and characteristics:
The Angoulfme prison dates from the Middle Ages, and has not undergone any more changes than the cathedral. Still called House of
Justice, it rests against the old presidial. The entrance gate is classical: it consists of a nail-studded door, solid in appearance, worn, low.
...A corridor dominates along the frontage at the ground level, and
a number of rooms give upon this hallway; their high and well-filled
windows draw their light from the courtyard. 9
The way in which the prison was administered also attests to
the dehumanizing social discredit in which the inmates fell by having broken the law. The jailer, who appeared to be the only person
responsible for the prisoners' well-being, held an overwhelming
power over them. He took advantage of their misery and helplessness by meting out his own sanctions and demanding payment for
his small acts of kindness:
Once imprisoned with the sum provided for by the law for the prisoner's food for a month, David found himself before a big man who,
for the captives, has a power greater than that of the King: the turnkey! In the provinces, the skinny jailer is unknown. Firstly, this position is almost a sinecure; also, the jailer is like an inn-keeper who
wouldn't have a house to pay for, he feeds himself very well by feeding the prisoners he houses very badly, for whom, moreover, he, like
the innkeeper, provides the rooms he has. He knew David by name;
because of his father especially, and he had the consideration to
have him sleep well for one night, despite the fact that David was
penniless.'8
Among the "horrors of the prison and the coarseness of its ways,"'
the squalor of the inmates' cells was a constant reminder of their
transgressions and of the distance that their acts had placed be92. Id. at 713-14.
93.
94.

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
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tween them and their basic right to human dignity:
The walls of this cell were made of stone and were quite damp. The
very high windows had iron bars. The stone flags gave out a freezing
coldness. You could hear the regular steps of the guard on sentry
duty who was walking in the corridor. This monotonous noise, like
that of the tide, provoked this thought in you at any moment: "We
are keeping you! You are not free!" . . . David noticed a horrible

bed .... It was forbidden to give light to the prisoners .... David
...[fell asleep] on the sort of cot with a horrible mattress in vulgar
brown material.. . . [T]here was only one wooden chair of the most
vile sort ... [and] a hideous tub placed in the corner ....

In addition to attacking the deplorable conditions of the
prison, Balzac also inveighs against the fact that David, a would-be
insolvent debtor, is treated as a criminal offender. In Balzac's opinion, David's incarceration, in the shadow of "some convicted criminal [who] had just been set free, having done his time,"" and
between "the walls strewn with the names . . [of his] predecessors, '97 was totally unjustifiable. It appears from this situation that

the mores' salutory effect upon the laws had at least one
inconvenience:
For the reasons alluded to above, prison detention for the failure to
pay one's debts is a judicial fact so rare in the provinces that, in
most cities in France, there is no detention facility. In this case, the
debtor is sent to the prison where we jail those who are indicted,
those in custody for trial, those accused of a crime, and those who
have been convicted."
By transforming the process of imprisonment for debts into "an
extremely difficult procedural task,"" the local mores precluded
any distinction between the imprisonment of hardened criminals
and the detention of debtors, whose misconduct, in all probability,
stems from unforeseeable financial changes, bad luck, and personal
hardship. Moreover, in a number of places in the text, Balzac underscores the psychological effect of imprisonment, ostensibly for
the purpose of pointing out perhaps its only redeeming value:
"Prison enormously fosters an examination of conscience. ....,0
95.

Id. at 714-15.
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"(The most obscure prisons bring about some illuminating insights)." 10
' He, however, adds the following qualification to his
statement: "All these details, this group of things, have a prodigious effect upon the morale of honorable people.'"0 2 This observation not only emphasizes the alienation from society felt by the
moral characters, but also makes apparent the fundamental contradictions and perversity of the social fabric. On the one hand, the
rationale for having prisons is to punish individuals who have violated the law; on the other hand, prisons can produce a moral effect only in those persons who are respectable and of good conscience. The imposition of retributive sanctions for the purpose of
correcting attitudes and behavior, therefore, is destined to be ineffectual and to work against the interests of justice; to achieve this
purpose, they can be applied only against "honorable people,"''
who have no need of this incentive to lead exemplary lives. Faced
with such inconsistencies and inequities, it is hardly surprising
that the narrator reserves his praise for the angelic characters,
who, despite their apparent implausibility as models of human behavior and their inability to function and to succeed in the Romanesque society, are the symbols of a preferred and more authentic humanity.
The Partnership Agreement
Remorseful and disheartened by the shame of imprisonment,
David is ready to endure the final torment that his adversaries
have prepared for him. At this stage of the novel, his sole desire is
to be left alone and to gain a permanent respite from the morass of
litigation. He, therefore, agrees to form a partnership with the
Cointet brothers, hoping that it will put an end to his financial and
legal tribulations: Eve "restated to her husband the conditions of
the offer that Petit-Claud had supposedly obtained from the
Cointets, and which were no sooner accepted by David with visible
pleasure."' " Forcing David into a partnership and no more, however, would have been only half a victory for the Cointet brothers;
to satisfy their avariciousness, they had to negotiate the deal in
such a way as to allow them to obtain, in the near future, the full
rights to David's invention. To arrive at this objective, they relied
Id. at 715.
102. Id. at 714 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
101.

104. Id. at 716.
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upon the mystical and mystifying quality of legal prose.
In addition to Petit-Claud's misrepresentation of his interests,
David's commitment to intellectual pursuits put him at a disadvantage in the negotiations:
David was waiting for the meeting with the Cointets with a vague
sense of worry: neither the discussion of his interests nor that relating to the agreement to be drawn up were the cause of his worry;
but the opinion that the manufacturers would have of his work. He
found himself in the situation of the author of drama standing
before his critics. The inventor's pride and his anxieties at the moment of reaching the goal made any other feeling fade away. 10 5
To the contrary of what David anticipated, the Cointet brothers
did not intend to assess the merit of his creative work; they already were very much aware of its commercial worth, and their
strategy was to bring up practical problems in order to discredit
the value of his ideas and obtain the rights to them at the least
possible cost. These masterful negotiators successfully cast a false
appearance upon the real value of their projected investment by
insisting upon the potential risks of the venture and by challenging
David and his would-be legal counsel to find a means by which to
resolve the apparently dichotomous interests of the respective parties to the agreement:
They found themselves firstly blocked by a preliminary difficulty:
how to enter into a partnership agreement without knowing the substance of David's techniques? And once David's techniques were revealed, David found himself at the Cointet's mercy.'"
By creating problems of this nature, Boniface Cointet achieved his
objective: he had a clause inserted in the partnership agreement
which provided that David would be deprived of all his rights to
the invention in the event that the conditions of the partnership
should fail. He also managed to have the patent put in his name:
One of the clauses of the agreement completely stripped David
S6chard of his rights in the event that he failed to accomplish the
promises contained in ... the document carefully prepared by the
great Cointet and agreed to by David.
The great Cointet demanded the right to put his name on the patent
of invention. He succeeded in advancing the idea that, as long as
105. Id. at 719.
106. Id.
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David's effective rights were perfectly stated in the agreement, it did
not matter in which of the partners' name the patent was
placed. . . . The lynx therefore triumphed on all the points. [of
discussion].101
Once David's experimentation had progressed sufficiently for
the purposes of commercialization, and' once Boniface had what he
needed to make an enormous profit, the Cointet brothers, on the
basis of the rights they had reserved for themselves in the terms of
the partnership agreement, decided to sue their inventor-partner,
requesting that the differences between them be resolved by an arbitral tribunal. In their complaint, they alleged that David had
failed to achieve the results he had promised under the terms of
the agreement:
The Cointet brothers demanded the restitution of the six thousand
francs and the rights to the patent as well as the future shares from
its exploitation, as an indemnity for the exorbitant expenses they,
made without having any results.'"
These formal legal motions and documents, however, did not reflect real grievances, but were rather yet another tactical move to
apply still more pressure upon David in the aim of having him
yield his interest in the partnership prematurely and at a low cost.
As Petit-Claud, who in the meantime had been appointed, in an
ironic twist of the story, "the defender of the widow, the tutor of
the orphan," 10 ' advised his former clients, this time with a candor
that would have spared them previously considerable trouble, the
legal system did not offer them any remedies that were really acceptable. The law was incapable of unmasking and punishing the
Cointets' true intentions:
The Cointets have caused you enough pain; I want to put an end to
their pretensions. Listen, today, I am a magistrate, I owe you the
truth. You see, the Cointets are playing with you right now; but you
are in the palms of their hands. You could win the case that they are
building against you, by accepting war. Do you still want to be litigating at the end of ten years? They will request a multiplicity of
expert testimony and arbitral meetings, and you will be subject to
the hazard of the most contradictory opinions .... Listen, a bad
settlement is worth more than a good trial. ...10
107.
108.

Id. at 723-24.
Id. at 729.

109. Id.
110.

Id. at 730.
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Preferring anything to the entanglements of litigation, David
and Eve agreed to accept the "bad settlement" 1 ' that Petit-Claud
offered to get for them. With the money they would acquire from
the settlement, they could live comfortably. In Petit-Claud's
words: "With ten thousand francs, you will have another five hundred francs of annuity, and, in your lovely little property, you will
live happily!"'11 2 Owing to the subtle manipulation to which the
laws lend themselves, in complete contempt of their honesty and
generosity, David and Pve S6chard were "ruined, but left alone," 8
while Boniface Cointet was put well on his way to becoming a
prominent figure in the industrialization of the French economy-a wealthy and famous entrepreneur who stole and commercialized someone else's idea.
CONCLUSION: BALZAC'S ADVOCACY

OF A JURIDICAL

HUMANISM

As in C#sar Birotteau, the fate of David and Eve S6chard represents the undisputed triumph of insidious social scheming in the
Balzacian novel. Although David and kve were not reduced to
bankruptcy, the law offered them only a "bad settlement,""'4 and
this after a long, costly and agonizing legal nightmare; the legal
process played a key role in their downfall and in their ultimate
alienation from society. While the inventor and his wife clung
helplessly-perhaps foolishly-to their belief in the sanctity of
human relations, their unscrupulous foes, with the help of the legal
system, climbed the ladder of social success and notoriety unimpeded. In the last analysis, the substance and conclusion of Lost
Illusions support the impression of many critics that, "[ifn this society, to read a Balzac novel, was to find the life that one had
around oneself every day."'" Moreover, it is equally evident that
Balzac's Romanesque transcription of the social reality of his times
constitutes a statement of the potential corruptibility and actual
corruption of human nature-a statement grounded in a firm and
unmistakable sense of what is real. In the Balzacian cosmos, social
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See text accompanying notes 110-111 supra.
115. Sagnes, Introduction to 3 H. Dz BALZAC, LA COM9DIE HUMAINE-L'INTRDICTION
405, 410 (P.-G. Castex & G. Sagnes, eds. 1977). See also Bouyssou, Balzac a la facult de
droit, Thomassy et Popinot, [1972] ANN. BALZAc 363 (1972); Le Yaouanc, Sur l'Interdiction
253 (1971).
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institutions, such as the law, are put to such degenerate use by
men that they come exclusively to foster and epitomize what is
most evil in man. Clearly then, within the confines of such a society, goodness is inoperative, and the laws are destined to promote
and safeguard a vilified state of human existence.
As suggested previously, however, the pessimism generated
and sustained by the realism of the narrative does not adequately
account for the breadth of Balzac's literary vision or of his concept
of law. Rather than corroborate the sense of moral nihilism in the
novels, the omniscient narrator's humanistic commentary and the
example of the angelic characters dissipate, perhaps even eliminate
the impression of a moral void. In regard to the law, Balzac appears to argue that, despite the outcome of the novels, an ideal
standard of Justice does exist and can be ascertained by man and
transposed, imperfectly but not unacceptably, into the daily operations of social life. Indeed, he seems to suggest further that the
legal process can lay claim to legitimacy only to the extent that it
achieves a basic conformity with that ideal standard. While, because of its technical character, the law can be manipulated to
launch intricate schemes against unsuspecting victims, and while it
can become a springboard to illicit social advancement, the law can
also, if men wish it to, reflect the intrinsic human capacity to engage in positive moral conduct. Balzac seems, in fact, to state that
this is the very raison d'&tre of law.
Although he does not require that the legal system eliminate
human disloyalty and maliciousness entirely, Balzac wants it to
fulfill a truly creative function within society: not only by establishing a semblance of order among unruly human passions, but
also, much like the writer in relation to his work, by instilling a
sense of fairness, truth and humanity in human relations-in a
word, by grafting onto the operation of society the immutable tenets that are anchored in and emerge from man's essential moral
nature. Balzac's advocacy of this natural law juridical humanism
1 16 Alperhaps is most explicit in his short novel, The Interdiction.
though the outcome of the story once again upholds the thesis that
society is dominated by corruption,11 7 the portrayal of Judge Popinot and the Marquis d'Espard reflects the Balzacian conception of
a humanly possible juridical ideal. In this sense, the substance of
116.
117.

Sagnes, supra note 115, at 424.
See text at notes 144-147 infra.
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The Interdiction serves as an appropriate conclusion to Balzac's
consideration of the law in Cksar Birotteau and Lost Illusions.
The Interdiction focuses upon the preliminary stages of a
hearing to determine the legal competency of one of the protagonists. The Marquis d'Espard, a nobleman of prominent and wellestablished lineage, is the object of an action initiated by his estranged wife in which she contends that her husband's mental
state has degenerated to such an extent that he is no longer capable of retaining custody of their two young children or of managing
the affairs relating to his estate. To substantiate her claim, the
Marquise d'Espard alleges, inter alia, that her husband has, for no
apparent reason, developed an obsessional concern for the welfare
of one Madame Jeanrenaud and her son-spending enormous
amounts of money to satisfy their whims to the total disregard of
the well-being of his two young sons, obliging them, in effect, to
live in a manner unbecoming of their aristocratic station and future role in society. 118 Upon receipt of the petition, the chief justice
assigns the matter to an associate judge, Jean-Jules Popinot, who
is required to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit a report to the court. 119
As has become commonplace in the Balzacian novels dealing
with the law, the official legal position advanced by the characters
gives only the appearance of truth. Accordingly, the suspense of
The Interdiction centers upon two key issues: first, whether Judge
Popinot will be able to resist the Marquise d'Espard's efforts to
engage him in what will emerge as an illicit cause; and, second,
whether the judge will be able to discover the actual motivation for
her action and bring it to the surface as the determinative rationale in his official report. Typically, the Marquise is a consummate
intrigant;12 0 through the mediation of her suitor, she prevails upon
the judge's nephew to invite the judge to her residence to discuss
the case. 121 Although Popinot initially refuses to come, citing an
article of the code prohibiting magistrates from being entertained
in the homes of litigants, he decides, upon further consideration, to
accept the invitation, but only to advance his investigation. 122 Indeed, rather than being seduced by the Marquise's prominence and
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See 3
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

H. DE BALZAC, supra note 114, at 446.
437.
455, 451-56.
425-29.
442, 450.
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influence, the old judge makes her the unwilling victim of his perspicacious and adroit questioning: "The Marquise's tact and her
habit of judging men made her understand that Mr. Popinot could
not be influenced by any consideration. She had counted upon
[having] some ambitious magistrate, she met up with a man of
conscience.'"" Satisfied that the actual motivation for the Marquise's action is far from clear, the judge leaves before tea is served
in order to interview the other parties involved. " 4
It is not surprising that the Marquise's efforts to undermine
Judge Popinot's judicial integrity were unavailing; as his nephew
warned the Marquise's suitor, Popinot was a "judge like death was
death."12 ' Balzac, in fact, portrays Judge Popinot as a truly exemplary human being who possesses an unfailing commitment to
truth and justice. In the Balzacian cosmology, the judge, like C6sar
Birotteau and David and tve S6chard, is an angelic character; although he also suffers social alienation because of his moral integrity, unlike them, he possesses the celebrated gift of second vision,1 2 6 a special insight into the operation of things human which
Balzac bestows upon those characters of whom he especially is
fond and which prevents them at least from being the unwitting
victims of schemes and intrigues:
One feature alone recommended this face to the physiognomist.
This man had a mouth upon the lips of which divine goodness
breathed. They were good big red lips.., upon which nature had
expressed good feelings; lips which spoke to the heart and announced in this man intelligence, clarity, the gift of second vision,
an angelic mind.. . . His life corresponded to his physiognomy;
it
17
was full of secret works and hid the virtue of a saint. $
Although his refusal to engage in the political machinations of
the judiciary had thwarted his rise to the august position merited
by the quality of his work and of his intellect, Judge Popinot
brought to all his cases an unswerving loyalty to truth and an uncompromising sense of justice. 8 In deciding disputes, he looked at
the facts of the case as much from the perspective of equity as
from the standpoint of legal principles themselves; for Balzac,
123.
124.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 467-68.

125. Id. at 426.
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Popinot's devotion to equitable considerations was one of the signs
of his great distinction as a magistrate:
Equity is based upon the facts, law is the application of [legal] principles to the facts. A man can be right according to equity, but
wrong in justice, without having the judge called into question. Between conscience and fact, there is a gulf of determinative reasons
that are unknown to the judge, and which condemn or legitimize a
fact. A judge is not God; his task is to adapt facts to principles, to
judge cases which are infinitely diverse, by using a fixed measure. If
the, judge had the power to read the conscience and to unravel the
motives in order to render equitable judgments, each judge would be
a great man. France needs about six thousand judges; no generation
has six thousand great men at its disposal, all the more reason is it
unable to find them for its magistrature. 1
In a word, Popinot knew how to be both an "inflexible
judge" 180 and a "charitable man;"1 " he could discern the truth in a
case without recourse to the usual judicial ploys. Moreover, unknown to any of his colleagues, Judge Popinot, when he was off the
bench, would engage in private works aimed at eliminating crime
at its very roots; as Balzac states, "the judge was the social side in
him; another man [-] greater and less known [-] was to be found
within him [in his personal life]." 13 ' This "secret apostolate" " 8 of
the judge consisted in providing material assistance and a variety
of counseling and employment services to the poor of his neighborhood. Describing Popinot as "the Saint Vincent de Paul" 3" of his
neighborhood, Balzac adds that "he attended to everything, he
prevented crime, he gave work to unemployed laborers, he had the
crippled placed [in the proper institutions], he distributed his aid
with discernment

. . .

, appointed himself as the counsel for wid-

ows, the protector of homeless children, the silent partner of small
businesses."I 5
Although the Marquise had dressed her petition in the garb of
convincing legal allegations, the judge was alerted nonetheless, by
his reading of the complaint and by the experience of his visit, to
the fact that her contentions might--and almost surely
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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did-represent a deliberate falsification of the truth.1 8 Accordingly, during the interview between himself and the Marquis
d'Espard, the judge discovered that, despite his exceedingly bizarre
conduct toward the Jeanrenauds, the Marquis, with the full knowledge of his wife,137 actually.was setting about to rid his family history and name of an act of dishonesty' " which had remained unknown till then. In the late seventeenth century, following the
revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1" the Marquis' family had acquired great landed wealth by involving itself in the royal intrigues
to dispossess Protestant landowners of their property-in this case
one Jeanrenaud. Upon discovering the fact, and not wanting to
leave his sons with a soiled coat of arms, the Marquis resolved to
find the unfortunate Jeanrenaud's descendants and to make
amends for his forebear's wrong-doing. In relation to Judge Popinot, the Marquis, an angelic character in his own right, saw the
question of justice in this matter not in terms of legal technicalities, which would have absolved him of any obligation to engage in
restitution, but rather in terms of a higher, more binding law.-a
sense of justice governing his conscience as a man: "
"In my eyes, sir, the rights of the Jeanrenauds were clear. For the
statute of limitations to run, don't the holders [of the property]
have to be capable of attack? To what authority would the [Protestant] refugees have addressed themselves? Their court was up
above, or rather, sir, the court was here," the Marquis said striking
his heart."1
Having located the Jeanrenauds, who by this time had become
nearly destitute, " 2 the Marquis reached an agreement with them
providing for an equitable restitution price and reasonable repayment schedule. The Marquise d'Espard, however, vehemently opposed any plan to modify her present life style in order to reimburse the Jeanrenauds, preferring, in fact, to be separated from her
husband and leave him the custody of ind responsibility for their
136. Id. at 466, 469-70.
137. Id. at 485.
138.
139.

Id. at 483-85.
The Edict of Nantes, signed by Henri IV in 1598, extended official religions toler-

ation to French Protestants. Henri's grandson, Louis XIV, revoked the edict in 1685, abolishing the legal status of Protestants and tiching off a variety of responses among
Catholics, ranging from the distribution of catechisms to forced conversions by violent
means.
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young children.14 3
Having established that the Marquis' conduct did not represent the ravings of a demented mind, but rather reflected the
most noble motives of human behavior, Judge Popinot closed his
investigation and was ready to submit his report to the court. On
the morning of the appointed day,14 4 however, the chief justice
asked to see Popinot in his chambers, where he informed him that
the Keeper of the Seals had requested that he not continue on the
case. The Marquise had let it be known to the relevant judicial
authorities that the judge had been at her house for tea during the
course of the investigation, and the mere mention of such a situation immediately conjured up rumors of judicial impropriety. Despite Popinot's protests-he asserted, for example, that he had left
before tea had been served-the chief justice reassured him that it
was not a disciplinary matter, but merely a prudent arrangement
for the sake of convenience. He further promised that Popinot's
compliance with the request would entitle him to the cross of the
Ugion d'honneur:
"I am persuaded ... that you have conducted yourself in the strictest independence in this matter.... [B]ut it suffices that the Keeper
of the Seals has talked about it, that rumors spread on your account.
... Any conflict with public opinion is always dangerous .... In a

word, I am asking you to declare yourself incompetent as a personal
favor; in return, you will get the cross of the Lkgion d'honneur

which has been due you for such a long time, I make it my task.'"

Presented with a fait accompli, Popinot had no choice but to remove himself from the case; he was replaced by a recently promoted judge, one Camusot, whose ambition to succeed made him
particularly vulnerable to the needs and desires of influential
6
litigants."
Despite a similarity in the conclusion-the ultimate frustration of justice, The Interdiction, unlike either Csar Birotteau or
Lost Illusions, goes beyond the narrator's description of and invective against the abuse of law by men. Of the three novels, it alone
contains explicit textual examples of Balzac's view, not only of an
ideal of natural Justice, but also of the kind of morally acceptable
143. Id. at 485.
144. Id. at 491-93.
145. Id. at 492.
146. Id. at 493.
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administration of Justice that can be achieved in society. The Marquis d'Espard's self-imposed standard of restitution and Judge
Popinot's irreproachable official conduct imply that, in the
Balzacian perspective, the law is a neutral instrument; its worth as
a social institution is determined by the use men make of it. Like
Petit-Claud and Camusot, men can employ the law as a device for
social advancement; or, in keeping with the examples set by Judge
Popinot and the Marquis d'Espard, they can lessen its importance
as a technical tool and emphasize its vitality as an instrument of
social and personal justice. The Balzacian vision of the law, then, is
closely akin to natural law norms: the legal devices invented by
men can serve no legitimizing function in society unless the men
who promulgate and administer the laws identify them with an
overriding moral sense, unless they instill the legal system and its
judicial offices with moral consciousness. For Balzac, the greatest
of all follies is to follow the immoral ways of society, for it surely
will lead to the destruction of man's most precious gift: his
humanity.

